

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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This is UNEVALUATED Information

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
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(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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1. The development and effectiveness of the Rumanian Air Force will be dependent on the three following factors, which have been considered in Rumania with some seriousness since 1949:

- a. Level of training.
- b. Professional quality of the flight instructors.
- c. Quality and number of aircraft.

Level of Training

2. Since 1949, cadets for the Officer Pilot School and NCO Pilot School have been recruited from among the conscript soldiers in AF units and from graduates of civilian pilot schools, without much regard to educational background. The regime found it sufficient that the prospective cadet know how to read and write and that he have a healthy social origin, i.e., that he be of peasant stock. Those with an education of more than four primary classes were considered part of the bourgeoisie. Occasionally, individuals with three or four years of high school education were accepted by the Air Cadet Schools.

USAF review completed.

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3. In 1947, personnel were taken from AF units for the Officer and NCO Pilot Schools, the prerequisite being a minimum of four years' high school education or the equivalent thereof. In the Fall of 1949, two months before cadet graduation, 18 of the 25 cadets considered politically unreliable were dismissed from school and discharged from the AF. Starting in 1949, the recruiting of cadets was carried out on the basis of social origin and political reliability. Cadets were picked only from the three-year AF conscripts and from graduates of civilian schools for pilots. The regime, realizing the unsatisfactory background of these elements, instituted the so-called divisional schools in which the three-year conscripts took the three- to four month-course before being admitted into the Air Cadet Schools.

4. Eighty per cent of the young cadets had only three to four years' schooling. Many of these read and wrote with difficulty while others, were hardly able to sign their names.

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None had an apprentice or vocational school education. Twenty per cent had an educational background of two or three years in a vocational or apprentice school and had been employed in civilian life as lock-makers, lathe operators, mechanics, and chauffeurs. All, however, had a completely "healthy" social origin and their political development and education were left up to the school and later to their home bases.

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6. The Ministry of Armed Forces and the RumAF Command were forced to modify the Air Cadet School courses, reducing many of the courses to the simplest level, so that the subjects taught could be absorbed by the students. Because of this, the professors at the Schools were forced to make up all types of excuses to promote their cadets from student to officer status. The entire teaching staff was in a very precarious situation. If a group of cadets failed to graduate from the school, professors and instructors were accused of not wanting to produce new personnel and were therefore considered enemies of the people. If the students graduated from the school but gave evidence of poor preparation, again the professors and instructors were accused of not showing enough interest in teaching the new personnel and were considered enemies of the people.

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8. It should be noted specifically that, during the two-year Air Cadet course, the students accomplished a total of only 40 or 50 flying hours, which included solo and dual time. To indicate how eager the AF was for new rated personnel [] the following example: 25X1

- a. During 1950, [] Five [] students were able to fly solo after 40 to 42 dual sorties. It should be noted that all of these students had already completed primary and transition training. 25X1

9. The air regiments cannot be considered operational or tactical units. Because of the training situation, the air regiments actually became second Air Cadet Schools with no hope of becoming combat-ready units in less than eighteen months after the arrival of the new pilots. During the year 1 December 1950 to 1 December 1951, the 6th Bomber Regiment, Brasov Airfield, logged 2,000 hours, dual and solo, which included 1,600 landings with instructors.
10. Training within the air regiments presented a very critical problem because of the poor training background of the newly-commissioned pilots, the lack of instructors, and the lack of aircraft. Pilots [] flew only two days per week. The rest of the time was given over to ground courses and political lectures. 25X1
11. The low level of education of the new AF personnel may be illustrated by the following example: 25X1

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- b. On another occasion, a pilot answered that, to gauge engine temperature, a thermometer was fixed inside one of the cylinders. A navigator, asked to show Rumania on the map, pointed to Mexico.

12. Instrument flying [redacted] was done in the PO-2, a Soviet-built biplane. Approximately 15 to 18 hours per pilot were accomplished yearly. The total effect of this training was inconsequential. [redacted] in 10 seconds of flying on instruments, these pilots would lose control of their aircraft. The same situation was also prevalent for night flying which, from 1950 [redacted] had been carried out only in the PO-2 trainer. The most complex night-flying mission was a one-hour flight accomplished in a PO-2 trainer at a cruising speed of 110 kph. These missions consisted of a straight course to a point 50 km. from the airfield and back. 25X1
13. After every winter, the period of stagnation, the entire training had to be started anew. [redacted] there was no continuity and no progress in the training of air regiment personnel. 25X1
14. The following incidents, which occurred between the Summer of 1950 and 1 December 1951, further point to the inferior training of RumAF personnel:

a. Jet Division, Ianca Airfield /4510N-2727E/:

- (1) Two jet aircraft lost their way while circling the airfield and had to make forced landings after running out of fuel.
- (2) Another jet aircraft, while circling the airfield, lost its bearings and asked for directions by voice radio. The Flight Controller, to whom the aircraft reported that a city and a large lake were below it, could give no further directions other than to come back to the airfield. The jet pilot crash-landed in a field near the town of Galati /4527N-2803E/, severely damaging his aircraft.
- (3) A so-called jet pilot, ferrying a Soviet PO-2 biplane from Ianca to the Medias repair shops, flew into the clouds, lost his way, and finally crashed in the mountains near Intorsura Buzaului /4541N-2602E/. The pilot escaped unharmed.
- (4) Shortly after this accident, two more PO-2's were being ferried from Ianca to the Medias /4610N-2423E/ repair shops; these were being guided by a Fiesler-Storch, German-made three-seater liaison plane. Enroute, the Fiesler-Storch landed at Brasov Airfield; however, the two PO-2's had lost their leader and made forced landings along the Olt River Valley near the village of Miercurea Ciuc /4621N-2548E/.

b. Piston Fighter Division, Bucharest:

- (1) A pilot of the 1st Fighter Regiment was flying an IAR-80, stalled, completely lost control of his aircraft, and crashed fatally to the ground. Another pilot of this same regiment was to ferry an IAR-80 from Medias to Bucharest, i.e., flying in a southeasterly direction. He lost his way, landing at Targul Mures /4632N-2431E/, a distance of 60 km. directly northeast of Medias. Taking off from Targul Mures, he landed at Sibiu/Turnisor Airfield /4548N-2409E/, absolutely lost. The pilot was returned to Bucharest by train and another pilot was assigned to ferry the IAR-80.

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- (2) Another pilot, of the Fighter Regiment at Floesti/Targosorul Nou Airfield /4455N-2552E/, coming in for a landing in an IAR-80, undershot the field, applied power, made a faulty recovery, and ultimately crashed.
- (3) A fighter pilot from the regiment at Rosiorii de Vede /4406N-2457E/, unfamiliar with cockpit procedure, crashed fatally in an ME-109G.
- (4) A pilot from the 7th Bomber Regiment, Brasov Airfield, taking off in a YAK-12, could not control the torque, and consequently crashed.
- (5) Another pilot of the same regiment, also flying a YAK-12 on a training flight, exhausted his fuel, made a forced landing in a field, severely damaging the aircraft.
- (6) During maneuvers in the Fall of 1950, a pilot in a YAK-12 trainer aircraft attempted a simulated dogfight with an ME-109G, fell into a spin, failed to recover, and crashed fatally.

c. 4th Assault Regiment Accidents:

- (1) During maneuvers in the Fall of 1950, a squadron of 12 IAR-80 aircraft was in flight between Craiova Airfield /4419N-2353E/ and Galati Airfield /4527N-2803E/, the formation being led by the Regimental Commander, Major Ion VLASCEANU. The Commander and four aircraft did land at Galati. However, the other seven aircraft were separated from the main formation, lost their way, and landed on an open field somewhere southeast of Bucharest.
- (2) Two IAR-80's, in a flight between Bucharest and Sibiu, flew into the clouds, stalled, and crash-landed in the mountain region of Ramnicul Valcea /4506N-2423E/.

d. 2nd Bomber Division, Brasov Airfield:

- (1) Between April and November 1950, the 6th Bomber Regiment had eight accidents: One Savoia 79B bomber was destroyed in a landing accident; one Heinkel-111 twin-engine aircraft was damaged while landing; three IAR-39 bi-plane bombers were damaged while landing; three IAR-39's were destroyed while landing.
- (2) Between November 1950 and 1 April 1951, there were four accidents: one IAR-39, while on a cross-country flight in the Ardeal region, lost its way and landed in the Moldova region; one IAR-39 was damaged while landing; one IAR-39 was destroyed while landing; one IAR-39 was destroyed while undershooting the airfield.
- (3) A navigator dropped a live bomb at the edge of the village of Halchiu /4546-2533E/ which was situated three km. from the Codlea /4542N-2527E/ bombing range.

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- (4) During the maneuvers of the Fall of 1951, a pilot, class of 1950, flying a Fiesler-Storch with the Bomber Division Commander, Lt. Col. Nicolae CONTA, and the Regimental Navigator, Major (fnu) TARU, lost his way while on a liaison flight and, with dusk approaching, landed in a corn field, damaging the aircraft. No one suffered serious injuries.
- (5) Also during the 1951 Fall maneuvers, the pilot of a Junkers 52, while flying in the maneuver area with 12 staff officers as passengers, crossed the border, flying 20 km. into Yugoslavia and was shot at by Yugoslav AAA while crossing back into Rumania.
- (6) The pilot of an IAR-39 of the Reconnaissance Regiment at Turda/South Airfield /4632N-2347E/ lost his way while on a training mission and damaged the aircraft during a forced landing.

e. Accidents in the Air Cadet Schools:

- (1) At Air Cadet School No. 1, Zilistea Airfield, a cadet flying an ME-109G which developed engine trouble in descending, reached an altitude of 30 m. at which point he bailed out. The pilot was killed and the aircraft completely destroyed.
- (2) At Air Cadet School No. 2, Focsani /4542N-2712E/, a pilot flying an IAR-80, nosed the aircraft into the ground upon take-off, somersaulted, and was instantly killed.
- (3) At the Aviation Instruction Center, Tecuci Airfield /4551N-2724E/, during the Summer of 1950, a student-instructor, flying an LA-9, undershot the airfield and crashed fatally in an orchard.

15. In addition to deficiencies in training, there were many other obstacles in the way of rated personnel.

- a. All pilots were heavily-bound by all types of formalities and red tape.
- b. Order No. 1500, which limited the refueling of each aircraft, endangered the pilot's life in that it decreed that no aircraft could carry more fuel than would be needed for 250 km.
- c. Complete responsibility for accidents was placed upon the Regiment and Squadron Commanders, resulting in extreme precautions on their part before a pilot was allowed to fly.
- d. The lack of commanders and instructors in the air regiments resulted in the superficial training of rated personnel.
- e. Eighty per cent of the divisional and regimental commanders were individuals who had been advanced by the Regime and whose prime qualification was political reliability. They did not have the proper professional background.
- f. The very few old pilots who were deputies for flying or instructors lived more or less on borrowed time, expecting to be purged from one day to the next. They were continually tense and did not by any means use their capabilities to the fullest extent.

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- g. Radio navigation was almost a forgotten art. As of March 1952, the entire RumAF had only two or three crews, belonging to the 8th Transport Regiment, which were able to execute a flight with the aid of radio navigation.

Professional Quality of the Flight Instructors

16. Instructors at the Air Cadet Schools. Five per cent of the instructors at the Air Cadet Schools were old and proficient pilots with World War II combat experience. These instructors, although well-acquainted with the methods of the Regime and continual purging, did not show any real interest in their work and prepared the pilots to do nothing more than minimum basic flying. The instructors were in a continual state of tension, being constantly watched by the Counter Information Officers and by the Political Service.
17. Sixty per cent of the instructors at the Air Cadet Schools received their wings between 1945 and 1947 and had a very good professional and educational background. The period from 1947 to 1949 was a period of stagnation for the RumAF and consequently this group of instructors was never fully able to develop professionally. In 1949, when the RumAF placed a new and strong emphasis upon training and increased the number of its pilots, these instructors were able to regain some of their old proficiency. However, they had been basically trained to fly only during good flight conditions. Therefore, these instructors have been unable to add anything new to their store of knowledge since their cadet days. Thirty-five per cent of the instructors at the Air Cadet Schools received their wings during 1949-1950, and were definitely sub-standard pilots and sub-standard instructors.
18. Regimental Instructors. Within the RumAF regiments, there was a continuous purge of experienced officers between 1945 and March 1952. Many were discharged; many were grounded and transferred to administrative positions. In the entire RumAF, only four per cent of the pilots were experienced officers who had seen combat in World War II. Too few of them were Regimental Commanders. Most of them were deputies for flying or gunnery training officers. Thus there were only one or two experienced officers per regiment, which was far below the number needed to train the pilots properly.
19. Their psychological state was such that personally and professionally they operated only on a day-to-day basis. As of March 1952, the training of the regimental pilots was such that tactical training could not even be considered practical without at least 18 months of transitional training.
20. [redacted] During the Fall of 1951, [redacted] sent three IAR-39's on a simulated bombing mission over the city of Sighisoara, 100 km. from Brasov. The ceiling that day was 4,000 m. and the formation was ordered to fly at an altitude of 2,000 m. The Flight Commander at that time was Capt. Gheorghe SEINIUC, who in December 1951 was named Commander of the 17th Bomber Regiment. The Mission was a complete failure because the formation could not find the target. This occurred during peacetime with no combat tension on the part of the crews, at an altitude of 2,000 m. over familiar terrain, on a mission of short distance, and in aircraft which traveled 200 kph.

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Quality and Number of Aircraft

21. With the exception of the newly-formed jet division, all of the aircraft in the RumAF were old pre-World War II models which had seen very heavy duty in World War II. There were many different types of aircraft, very few spare parts and, above all, an insufficient number of aircraft.
22. The 7th Bomber Division, Brasov Airfield, with its two Bomber Regiments, did not have the aircraft necessary to train its personnel properly. The entire Division had the following strength: 12 IAR-39's, biplane, single-engine training bomber; 3 Heinkel-111's, used as twin-engine transition craft; 4 PO-2's, used for night flying and coordination flying; 2 Aero-45's, used for transport and liaison; 1 Fiesler-Storch, used as liaison.
23. The Fighter and Assault Regiments had somewhat more homogeneous equipment which consisted of ME-109's, IAR-80's, and YAK-12's, but again very few. The same situation was prevalent in the Reconnaissance, Transport, and Liaison Regiments which had a great variety of equipment but a very low total number of aircraft. [redacted] the situation as regards the Seaplane Squadron, was the worst of all. 25X1
24. In September 1950, the USSR supplied the RumAF with four TU-2 light bombers, two TU-6 reconnaissance planes, five LA-9 fighters, and five IL-2 assault craft. These aircraft were used for the formation of a corps of Rumanian instructors who, in turn, could train the pilots of the air regiments. However, as of 13 March 1952, the USSR had not delivered any additional aircraft. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] the Rumanian air regiments were to be equipped with new Soviet aircraft by the Summer of 1952. However, [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] as of July, the RumAF had not received any aircraft from the USSR. This was probably due to lack of confidence on the part of the USSR toward Rumania since, within three months in the Spring of 1952, three Rumanian aircraft had been flown into Yugoslavia by defectors. 25X1
25. As may be seen above, with the exception of the Jet Division, [redacted] the entire RumAF personnel trained with antiquated and insufficient equipment. 25X1

Present [redacted] and Future Battleworthiness of the Rumanian Air Force

26. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] the Rumanian Jet Division personnel, which was entirely composed of young pilots, class of 1949 or later, was absolutely incapable of participating in combat. Should a conflict occur, [redacted] the Rumanian jet aircraft would be called upon for assistance. However, should the Jet Division be brought into combat, [redacted] scarcely 10% of those not shot down in combat would be able to find their way back to the home base. 25X1
27. Among the piston fighters, as of March 1952 [redacted] only two full-strength squadrons could be considered ready for combat. This could be done only if the best pilots from all the fighter regiments were chosen to form these two squadrons and were given ME-109 aircraft. All other conventional fighter units would have no possibility of participating in combat because of the lack of training of their personnel and the lack of fighter aircraft. 25X1

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28. The assault units were equally unprepared to face combat as of March 1952. The personnel were not trained and equipment was lacking.
29. As of March 1952, the bomber units could possibly have offered five well-trained crews. The only problem was the lack of proper bomber aircraft and the fact that the only one which could be flown was the IAR-39 which carried a maximum of 24 12-kg bombs, flew at 200 kph., and had a two-hour flying range.
30. The reconnaissance unit also used the IAR-39 aircraft and thus could carry out no more than artillery spotting missions.
31. [] the transport unit had only three well-trained all-weather crews. The rest of the personnel could fly missions only during favorable weather conditions. 25X1
32. The seaplane unit, [] very poorly-equipped both in aircraft and personnel, could, [], possibly perform reconnaissance missions only along the coast or over the Black Sea. 25X1
33. [] 25X1
34. By 1953, the conventional fighter units could possibly have a combat-ready fighter regiment at full strength equipped with ME-109G fighter aircraft. The rest of the fighter units have neither personnel nor aircraft which could be considered battleworthy. If the fighter units were to be equipped with LA-9 Soviet fighters as had been planned and if these aircraft were to be delivered, at the latest by the Spring of 1953, [] by the Summer of 1955, RumAF might have one fighter division with two or three fighter regiments at full strength ready to enter combat. Of this Division, [] personnel amounting to the strength of one regiment could be considered proficient fighter pilots. 25X1
35. If the assault units receive the projected IL-2 aircraft by the Spring of 1953, [] by the Fall of 1955, one regiment will be combat-ready and possibly two regiments by the Fall of 1956. 25X1
36. The 5th Reconnaissance Regiment, which was to receive the TU-6 twin-engine aircraft, might, by 1954, have seven to eight crews ready to carry out reconnaissance missions and only by the Fall of 1955 [] might be able to operate with two squadrons at full strength. 25X1
37. If the bomber units receive the projected TU-2 light bombers by the Spring of 1953, [] by the Fall of 1955 one regiment will be combat-ready, and possibly two regiments by the Fall of 1956. The bomber unit will be able to complete missions only in the best of weather conditions and [] absolutely out of the question that they would be able to carry out night missions. 25X1
38. The transport unit which was to receive the LI-2, DC-3 type transports, in 1952 or 1953, may, by 1954, be ready to fly missions under favorable weather conditions.
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40. Above are [redacted] the battle-worthiness of the RumAF. [redacted]
[redacted] in the event of combat, [redacted] a minimum of
40% of the crews would attempt to land on western airfields pre-
ferring to surrender rather than return. Regardless of all the
propaganda to which the Rumanian pilots are exposed, they still
realize how inferior they are to the western air forces from the
point of view of training and instruction. [redacted]

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